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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge 
 
When the Newark police arrived at 5:30 in the morning to 
investigate the scene of a reported burglary, they discovered 
Alexander Loney standing nearby on his aunt's porch. 
Frisking him, the officers found hidden in his clothes 29 
packets of heroin and a .380 caliber Lorcin semiautomatic 
pistol loaded with one round of ammunition. The question 
on appeal is whether the District Court erred when it 
applied U.S.S.G. S 2K2.1(b)(5) and increased Loney's offense 
level by four points for possessing a firearm"in connection 
with" his drug offense. Loney emphasizes that the 
government has no further evidence tying the gun to his 
drug trafficking, and he claims the reason he carried the 
gun was that, after witnessing a friend's murder, he did not 




The United States Sentencing Guidelines require the 
four-level adjustment when "the defendant used or 
possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with 
another felony offense. . . ." S 2K2.1(b)(5). Loney does not 
contest that he possessed a firearm, nor does he question 
that his possession of the drugs constitutes "another felony 
offense" under the guideline provision. The dispute is over 
the meaning of the phrase "in connection with." Did Loney 
possess his gun "in connection with" his drug offense? 
 
The phrase "in connection with," according to Fowler's 
usage manual, is notable for its "vagueness and pliability." 
Fowler's Modern English Usage 172 (R.W. Burchfield ed., 
3d ed. 1996). Bryan Garner describes the phrase as"always 
a vague, loose connective, often used in reporting 
wrongdoing." A Dictionary of Modern American Usage 365 
(1998). 
 
Although these usage guides suggest using a narrower 
term when a more precise meaning is intended, sometimes 
an expansive phrase like "in connection with" is necessary. 
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Garner cites the example, "The FBI was searching for Mr. 
Bailey in connection with the stabbing of his friend." Id. Did 
Mr. Bailey commit the crime or did he just have useful 
information? The FBI probably did not know, and the words 
conveyed the uncertainty. 
 
Examples from the Oxford English Dictionary underscore 
that the phrase "in connection with" is used to capture a 
very wide variety of different relationships: De Quincey 
writes, "The war itself, taken in connexion with the bloody 
feuds that succeeded it, gave a shock to the civilisation of 
Greece." 1 Oxford English Dictionary 520 (compact edition 
1971). Froude's History of England explains, "Except in rare 
instances, the agricultural labourer held land in connexion 
with his house." Id. T. Fowler's text on logic instructs, "The 
student is requested to read this Preface in connexion with 
Chapter III." Id. 
 
Because we should interpret undefined terms in the 
guidelines, as in statutes, using the terms' meaning in 
ordinary usage, see, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 
137, 144-45, 116 S.Ct. 501, 506 (1995) (interpreting 
statutory language); Williams v. United States , 503 U.S. 
193, 200, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1119 (1992) (interpreting statute 
and guidelines), the examples above suggest that we should 
construe S 2K2.1(b)(5) as covering a wide range of 
relationships between the firearm possession and the other 
felony offense. "[T]he phrase `in connection with' should be 
interpreted broadly. . . ." United States v. Thompson, 32 
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1994). "[T]he meaning of the phrase `in 
connection with' should be construed expansively." United 
States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 247 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 
In keeping with this breadth, we have previously held 
that when a defendant accidently fired a gun and killed 
someone, he used the gun in connection with another 
felony offense. United States v. Brannan, 74 F.3d 448 (3d 
Cir. 1996). We added in dictum that the term "connection" 
can encompass any "causal or logical relation or sequence." 
Id. at 453 (quoting Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 278 (1990)). Although the phrase "in connection 
with" can carry a different meaning than the term 
"connection," in part because the former typically functions 
as a compound preposition and the latter a noun, the 
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definition of the single term does help us understand the 
larger phrase. 
 
Like the definition cited in Brannan, other dictionary 
definitions of the term "connection" are similarly broad: 
One defines the term simply as "an association or a 
relationship." American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 400 (3d ed. 1992). Another explains that the term 
expresses a "relationship or association in thought (as of 
cause and effect, logical sequence, mutual dependence or 
involvement)." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
481 (1961). Another defines it as "association; relationship" 
and gives as illustrations "the connection between crime 
and poverty; no connection with any other firm of the same 
name." Random House Dictionary of the English Language 
432 (2d ed. 1987). The OED lists as one sense the 
"condition of being related to something else by a bond of 
interdependence, causality, logical sequence, coherence, or 
the like; relation between things one of which is bound up 
with, or involved in, another." 1 Oxford English Dictionary 
520 (compact edition 1971). 
 
Together these definitions suggest that the phrase"in 
connection with" expresses some relationship or 
association, one that can be satisfied in a number of ways 
such as a causal or logical relation or other type of 
relationship. We do not attempt to provide an exhaustive 
list of relationships that will resolve every case. As other 
courts have observed, "no simple judicial formula can 
adequately capture the precise contours of the `in 
connection with' requirement, particularly in light of the 
myriad factual contexts in which the phrase might come 
into play. . . ." Wyatt, 102 F.3d at 247. See also Thompson, 
32 F.3d at 6 ("[I]t is difficult to sketch the outer boundary" 
of the relationship expressed by the phrase.). 
 
Despite the wide variety of relationships covered by the 
usage of the phrase "in connection with," Loney urges that 
we narrow its meaning and adopt a test requiring the 
government to prove "some causal nexus" between the gun 
and the felony, a standard he says was not satisfied in his 
case. We decline to adopt Loney's proposed test. As an 
initial matter, we think it is unclear what exactly is 
supposed to be the source of the causality--the gun, the 
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defendant, the other felony, or something else? And 
whatever the agent, what qualifies as having the right sort 
of causal effect? Suppose a defendant carries a concealed 
gun to a drug deal intending to shoot anyone who steps out 
of line. If the buyers are docile and the defendant never has 
reason to reveal his gun, his gun possession might not 
exert any "causal" effect on anything; but it would grossly 
distort our usage of "in connection with" to say that the 
defendant in this example did not possess his gun in 
connection with his drug offense. Consider that if someone 
vaccinated herself to avoid disease at her job in a hospital, 
it would be perfectly natural to say that she received the 
medical care "in connection with" her job, even though after 
receiving the inoculation she never encountered the disease 
at work. 
 
There is a limit, of course, to how much can be proved by 
invoking dictionary definitions and usage. As the Supreme 
Court has said: "We consider not only the bare meaning of 
the word but also its placement and purpose in the 
statutory scheme. `[T]he meaning of statutory language, 
plain or not, depends on context.' " Bailey, 516 at 145, 116 
S.Ct. at 506 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 
115 S.Ct. 552, 555 (1994)). See also King v. St. Vincent's 
Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 574 (1991). 
 
When we turn to the broader context of S 2K2.1(b)(5), 
several features conflict with Loney's suggested test. First, 
our interpretation of S 2K2.1(b)(5) must take into account 
that the sentence adjustment is not limited to "use" of a 
firearm but also applies to "possession," so we should not 
give "in connection with" a meaning so strict that it reads 
the possession standard out of S 2K2.1(b)(5)."In connection 
with" is not a synonym for "use." And the Supreme Court 
has emphasized that we should not interpret one word in a 
statute in a way that renders other parts of the statute 
functionless. See, e.g., Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145, 116 S.Ct. at 
506. 
 
A second reason for believing that the possession need 
not have any actual effect on the other felony offense is that 
the guideline applies to a defendant who merely possesses 
ammunition. If the guideline's drafters wanted to introduce 
some requirement of a causal effect through the phrase "in 
 
                                5 
  
connection with," it is strange that they expressly provided 
that the guideline applies to someone who had ammunition 
but not a firearm. 
 
Despite these broader contextual arguments against 
requiring proof of some causal effect as a necessary 
condition, as well as what dictionary definitions and 
ordinary usage show about the meaning of "in connection 
with," Loney argues on policy grounds that a four-level 
adjustment is a lot if "in connection with" is not read 
narrowly. We are unpersuaded. If the case were decided on 
bare policy grounds, it is far from clear that a narrow 
interpretation makes sense. Gun violence is a very serious 
problem in this country. Ordinary experience as well as 
empirical research show that when a criminal is armed, the 
risk of violence and serious harm is greater. 
 
One study cited in a 1996 report by the Department of 
Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics states that"of the 
almost 328,000 State prison inmates serving time for a 
violent crime in 1991, 30% were armed with a firearm when 
they committed the crime. Of those armed, 56% said that 
they fired the gun and most of those who fired said their 
victims were shot and either wounded or killed." Firearm 
Injury from Crime 5 http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/guns. 
Another report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics released 
in 1994 explained: 
 
       Violent offenders are increasingly likely to be armed. 
       . . . While the overall violent crime rate decreased 
       during the last decade, the rate of offenses committed 
       with pistols and revolvers rose from 9.2 percent in 
       1979 to 12.7 percent in 1992. From 1987 through 
       1992 there was an annual average of 858,000 rapes, 
       robberies and assaults with firearms of all types, 
       according to the BJS's National Crime Victimization 
       Survey. . . . In a nationally representative sample of 
       state prison inmates, 16 percent said they were 
       carrying a firearm during the commission of the offense 
       for which they were serving time, and one-half of those 
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The Bureau of Justice Statistics also cited a report 
estimating the costs of injuries caused by assaults with 
firearms: 
 
       The estimate for medical costs, mental health care, 
       emergency transport, police services, and insurance 
       administration were--$21,700 per fatal gunshot 
       wound[,] $28,000 per gunshot wound requiring 
       hospitalization[, and] $6,500 per gunshot wound 
       treated in the emergency department and released 
       without hospitalization. [The authors] estimated that 
       the total cost per survivor of gunshot wounds caused 
       by assault was $260,000. This figure included direct 
       costs such as medical costs as well as those costs 
       because of lost productivity and pain, suffering, and 
       reduced quality of life. Overall, they estimated that 
       firearm assault injury and death cost $63.4 billion in 
       1992. 
 
Firearm Injury from Crime 4 http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/guns. 
 
The government does not have to wait until a defendant 
pulls the trigger, uses the gun, or has the gun exert some 
causal effect before it can increase a defendant's sentence. 
And as is demonstrated by our earlier discussion of the 
meaning and context of the phrase "in connection with," we 
do not think S 2K2.1(b)(5) was drafted to require any of 
those greater showings by the government. Still, we 
recognize that the phrase "in connection with" requires that 
there be some relationship between the gun and the felony. 
The guideline says more than just that the person 
committed a felony offense and at some point in time and 
in some place possessed a gun. 
 
Other courts have recognized this point in comparing the 
"in connection with" language with the "in relation to" 
language used in 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1). See, e.g., United 
States v. Spurgeon, 117 F.3d 641, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(per curiam) ("The First, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits have held that the `in connection with' language of 
S 2K2.1(b)(5) should be construed as equivalent to the `in 
relation to' language of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1).") (citations 
omitted). In explaining the limitation imposed by the phrase 
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"in relation to" in S 924(c)(1), the Supreme Court has stated 
that the language ensures that the "presence or 
involvement [of the firearm] cannot be the result of accident 
or coincidence." Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 240, 238, 
113 S.Ct. 2050, 2059 (1993). More recently the Supreme 
Court said that the phrase "during and in relation to" in 
S 924(c)(1) was added 
 
       in part to prevent prosecutions where guns "played" no 
       part in the crime . . . cf. United States v. Stewart, 779 
       F.2d 538, 539 (C.A.9 1985) (Kennedy, J.) (observing 
       that " `in relation to' " was "added to allay explicitly the 
       concern that a person could be prosecuted . . . for 
       committing an entirely unrelated crime while in 
       possession of a firearm"), overruled in part on other 
       grounds, United States v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253, 
       1257 (C.A.9 1996). 
 
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 137, 118 S.Ct. 
1911, 1918-19 (1998). 
 
As a matter of ordinary language, one would be hard 
pressed to find a meaningful difference between"in relation 
to" and "in connection with." Nevertheless, while the phrase 
"in relation to" is essentially a synonym for"in connection 
with," it may not follow that every case applyingS 924(c)(1) 
is necessarily applicable to S 2K2.1(b)(5), for the Supreme 
Court recently emphasized that S 924(c)(1) requires that a 
defendant's use or carrying of a gun must be both"during" 
and "in relation to" a drug trafficking offense. "[T]he statute 
[is] applicable only where a defendant `carries' a gun both 
`during and in relation to' a drug crime." Muscarello, 524 
U.S. at 137, 118 S.Ct. at 1918. This caveat about 
S 924(c)(1) aside, we agree that where the Supreme Court 
construes just "in relation to," the reasoning can be applied 
to S 2K2.1(b)(5). 
 
Even once we focus attention on "in relation to," one 
remaining problem with relying heavily on the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the phrase is that the Court has 
not had occasion to elaborate in any detail on the standard. 
"We need not determine the precise contours of the `in 
relation to' requirement here, however, as petitioner's use of 
his MAC-10 meets any reasonable construction of it." 
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Smith, 508 U.S. at 238, 113 S.Ct. at 2059. Moreover, in 
response to the Court's narrowing interpretations of 
S 924(c)(1), Congress recently amended the statute in 
November of 1998 to include a new clause that makes 
S 924(c)(1) applicable not only to "use" or "carrying" a 
firearm but also to "possession." See Gray-Bey v. United 
States, 209 F.3d 986, 989 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting the 
amendment). But the new possession standard is not 
simply added to the list of "use" and "carry," which must be 
done "during and in relation to" the drug offense; rather the 
possession must be "in furtherance of " the drug offense. By 
making this distinction, Congress may well have intended 
"in furtherance" to impose a more stringent standard than 
"in relation to." The ordinary meanings of the terms 
certainly suggest a difference, and it is hard to see why 
Congress would have bothered to use separate language in 
a separate clause if a difference was not intended. If this is 
correct, then the Supreme Court may very well in the 
future interpret "in relation to" in a way that takes into 
account the differences between "in furtherance" and "in 
relation to" in S 924(c)(1). And any distinction drawn 
between the two phrases seems likely to underscore our 
point that "in connection with" does not require that a 
defendant's gun possession cause any particular effect. 
 
Even apart from the foregoing considerations, we think 
that nothing the Supreme Court has already said about "in 
relation to" is in any way inconsistent with what we have 
said here about "in connection with." Indeed, the Court has 
said, "The phrase `in relation to' is expansive." Smith, 508 
U.S. at 237, 113 S.Ct. at 2058. Much as in Muscarello, 
which gives the Court's most recent statement about"in 
relation to," the earlier case, Smith, said that the point of 
"in relation to" was to ensure that the "presence or 
involvement [of the firearm] cannot be the result of accident 
or coincidence." Smith, 508 U.S. at 238, 113 S.Ct. at 2059. 
"[T]he firearm must have some purpose or effect with 
respect to the drug trafficking crime," or"the gun at least 
must `facilitat[e], or ha[ve] the potential of facilitating,' the 
drug trafficking offense." Id. (citations omitted). 
 
In light of these standards Loney's argument can be 
expressed as saying that there was no relationship between 
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his gun possession and his possession of distribution 
quantities of drugs. As Muscarello put it, the gun 
possession was "entirely unrelated" to the felony offense. Or 
as Smith puts it, the presence of the gun was merely 
"accidental," had no "purpose or effect with respect to" his 
drug offense, or did not "facilitate or have the potential of 
facilitating" his drug dealing. 
 
At sentencing the government only has to prove guideline 
enhancements by a preponderance of the evidence, United 
States v. Dorsey, 174 F.3d 331, 332 (1999), and on appeal, 
we review a district court's factual findings at sentencing 
for clear error. United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 764 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
 
In this case the District Court expressly found that Loney 
"acknowledged the drugs he had on him were for purposes 
of sale and not just for personal use. That hasn't been a 
subject of dispute here." App. at 20. Turning to Loney's 
statement that he had the gun for personal protection, the 
District Court concluded that one reason, "if not the only 
[one]," that Loney felt he needed a gun for protection was 
his drug dealing. App. at 19. The District Court reasoned 
that Loney's need for the gun was increased because he 
possessed valuable and illegal drugs and, if a sale was 
successful, would later hold significant quantities of cash. 
It is true that the District Court was drawing inferences 
from the circumstances, but we think the inferences are 
reasonable ones. Factfinders routinely, and permissibly, 
draw inferences when they are evaluating a witness's 
credibility. 
 
More generally, we conclude that when a defendant has 
a loaded gun on his person while caught in the midst of a 
crime that involves in-person transactions, whether 
involving drugs or not, a district judge can reasonably infer 
that there is a relationship between the gun and the offense 
and hence S 2K2.1(b)(5) is satisfied. Cf. United States v. 
Sturtevant, 62 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 1995) (per curiam) 
(guideline applies to defendant who possessed a shotgun 
during an assault). The immediate availability of the gun 
while the defendant commits such a crime--that is, to use 
the Supreme Court's words in Smith, the gun's "potential of 
facilitating" such an in-person felony offense--is sufficient 
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to establish a relationship between the gun possession and 
the other offense. In keeping with this reasoning the First 
Circuit held in Sturtevant that a district court did not abuse 
its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before 
imposing an enhancement under S 2K2.1(b)(5) on a 
defendant who possessed a firearm during an assault but 
who never threatened the victim with the gun. The district 
court had explained to the defendant that "you were out 
there on the street with a deadly weapon; it might have 
been in your pocket, but it was there in reserve." 62 F.3d 
at 34. The First Circuit affirmed. 
 
       Given the broad reach of the "in connection with" 
       requirement, we think that the carriage of the gun 
       during the assault satisfied the requirement of section 
       2K2.1(b)(5) that a firearm be "used or possessed . . . in 
       connection with another felony offense. . . ." The courts 
       have held repeatedly that the presence of a readily 
       available weapon in a location containing drugs is 
       enough. . . . Sturtevant carried the shotgun on his 
       person during his assault. The connection between 
       that crime (the assault) and the gun seems to us no 
       less close than the connection between a drug hideout 
       and gun. In each instance, the weapon provides an 
       added sense of security and has a substantial potential 
       for use in the course of the particular crime in 
       question. 
 
Sturtevant, 62 F.3d at 34 (citations omitted). When a 
defendant has a loaded gun on his person while confronting 
a victim or buyer in person during an assault, drug deal, or 
robbery, it is easy to see that the gun has the potential for 
facilitating these types of crime. As we made clear above, 
there is no need to show that the defendant's gun 
possession actually "caused" any particular effect. Cf. 
United States v. Nale, 101 F.3d 1000, 1003 (4th Cir. 1996) 
("In Smith the Supreme Court determined that the `in 
relation to' language of S 924(c) could be satisfied by 
proving that a weapon facilitated or potentially facilitated 
the offense.") (citation omitted); United States v. Routon, 25 
F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1994) ( The guideline is satisfied 
when "the firearm was possessed in a manner that permits 
an inference that it facilitated or potentially facilitated--i.e., 
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had some potential emboldening role in--a defendant's 
felonious conduct."); United States v. Gomez-Arrellano, 5 
F.3d 464, 466-67 (10th Cir. 1993) ("The `in relation to' 
element is interpreted very expansively. Under S 924(c)(1), 
this element is satisfied if the government shows that the 
weapon facilitates or has the potential to facilitate the drug 
offense, but is not satisfied if the weapon's possession is 
coincidental or entirely unrelated to the offense. A weapon's 
physical proximity to narcotics may be sufficient to provide 
the nexus required between the weapon and the drug 
charges.") (citations omitted). 
 
The Supreme Court has said that the gun's relationship 
to a crime should not be "accidental," and Loney no doubt 
maintains that even if he obviously was intentionally 
carrying the gun, any relationship between the gun and his 
drugs was "accidental." A drug dealer who had a hunting 
rifle buried in his closet might well be able to maintain that 
the gun's presence around his drug dealing was accidental. 
Likewise, a judge conceivably might have believed, for 
instance, that Loney would have dropped his gun off at 
home and not carried it with him for protection when he 
actually engaged in drug dealing. But the District Court did 
not believe that here. While physical proximity alone may 
be insufficient in some cases, this is not a case, as the First 
Circuit has said, "of an accountant who, while forging 
checks, happens to have a gun in the desk drawer." 
Sturtevant, 62 F.3d at 34-35. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the August 25, 1999 judgment 
of the District Court will be affirmed. 
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